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Abstract
Suppose that international sharing risk—worldwide or with large num-
bers of countries—were costly. How much risk-sharing could be gained
in small sets (or “pools”) of countries? To answer this question, we com-
pute the means and variances of poolwide gross domestic product growth,
for all possible pools of any size drawn from a sample of 74 countries,
and compare them with the means and variances of consumption growth
in each country individually. From the difference, we infer potential di-
versification and welfare gains. As much as two-thirds of the first best,
full worldwide welfare gains can be obtained in groupings of as few as
seven countries. The largest potential gains arise from pools consisting
of countries in different regions and including countries with weak insti-
tutions. We argue international risk-sharing fails to emerge because the
largest potential gains are among countries that do not trust each other’s
willingness and ability to abide by international contractual obligations.
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1 Introduction
Despite major strides in lifting capital controls around the world and impressive
increases in cross-border holdings of financial assets, international financial in-
tegration is still far from complete: Individual countries’ consumption remains
more volatile than what would result from complete risk-sharing with the rest
of the world. In this paper, we conjecture that practical obstacles make inter-
national risk sharing costly, and that they depend on the number and charac-
teristics of potential partner countries to share risk with. Then, it can become
desirable to share risk within a well chosen subset of countries only.1 This paper
evaluates the potential gains associated with such limited risk sharing contracts.
How large would such groups need to be for the gains to be sizable? And which
groups would yield the largest gains?
Our main contribution consists in running a systematic search on all possi-
ble groupings, or “pools” of countries, using the variance-covariance matrix of
output and consumption growth rates observed in standard data for 74 coun-
tries. We compare the observed volatility of consumption for each country with
the volatility of poolwide output, for each possible pool.2 Consumption data
are relevant because they reflect the insurance mechanisms that already exist
in each country. Under risk sharing within the pool, consumption growth in
each country equals poolwide output growth. Therefore, the comparison quan-
tifies the potential for additional diversification gains—and ultimately welfare
gains—that would accrue to each country from moving to complete risk-sharing
within each pool considered. For any possible pool size, we identify the country
groupings that minimize poolwide GDP volatility, and maximize welfare gains
from international diversification.
We find that pools of fewer than ten countries can provide the bulk of the
potential first best, worldwide risk sharing gains. In those well chosen groupings,
1We do not observe worldwide risk sharing, but we do not observe sharing of GDP risk
within groups of countries either. How could risk sharing be achieved in practice for a subset
of countries? Various schemes have been proposed, including Robert C. Merton’s (1990, 2000)
networks of bilateral swaps of GDP-linked income streams. Elements of risk sharing among
groups of countries are also present, for example, in pooling arrangements for international
reserves, such as the Chiang Mai initiative, the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), or
networks of bilateral swap arrangements (e.g., among the G7 in the 1960s-70s, among the
European countries during the run up to the establishment of the Euro, and among several
countries during the global financial and economic crisis that began in 2007-8). While these
existing real-world arrangements do not seek to share GDP risk explicitly, they do imply
some degree of sharing of macroeconomic risks among their member countries. On FLAR, see
Eichengreen (2007) and www.flar.net; on the Chiang Mai initiative, see Park and Wang (2005),
and http://aric.adb.org; on the earlier European experience, see Eichengreen and Wyplosz
(1993). On the sharing of GDP risks more generally see Shiller (1993); and Borensztein and
Mauro (2004) for a review of the literature.
2In this regard, our approach differs from previous studies: by Obstfeld (1994) and Lewis
(2000), who used consumption data only, and by Tesar (1995), who modeled explicitly the
saving / investment decisions that determine production in general equilibrium. However, the
paper’s results are unchanged if we use consumption data only, or production data only.
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the marginal gains decline quickly for groups beyond six or seven members.
Many small pools yield large risk-sharing gains. Unsurprisingly, such pools
involve relatively volatile economies.3
If the gains from international risk sharing are so significant, and could
in principle be attained in relatively small groups of countries, why do such
arrangements not emerge more often? One possibility is that they face partic-
ularly costly obstacles. As we show in the paper, the largest potential gains
are often attained by sharing risk with distant countries characterized by weak
institutional quality and a history of default on international debt obligations.
In that light, the observed reluctance to engage in international risk-sharing
becomes less surprising: it may just stem from insufficient information about
the trustworthiness of potential partners or difficulties related to international
law. Then, risk sharing is especially costly precisely in those small groups of
countries where they would carry maximal gains.
To explore this issue further, we report the potential gains that would result
from risk-sharing arrangements if they were constrained to countries selected
from a universe with certain characteristics—the same geographic region, or
relatively strong institutions. In those potential country groupings, the costs
associated with sharing GDP risk are presumably lower, and so a local arrange-
ment is more likely to emerge. But as we show, these are also countries whose
GDP risks tend to be strongly correlated, and so where the gains from risk
sharing are smaller in the first place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the theo-
retical background to our empirical exercise— adapted from existing work. The
section also outlines how we handle the considerable combinatorial problem in-
volved in manipulating a sample of 74 countries. Section III presents the general
results on risk-sharing gains across subsets of countries. In Section IV, we esti-
mate how much risk sharing gains are reduced when countries are constrained
to share risk only with specific partners. Section V concludes.
2 Methodology
This section first outlines the theory motivating the paper’s empirics. Then it
describes the algorithms used to compute the risk sharing gains, in any subset
of countries, of any size, drawn from a universe of 74 countries with available
consumption and output data.
3Pallage and Robe (2003) show that the welfare cost of economic fluctuations is far larger
in developing countries than in advanced economies.
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2.1 Risk-Sharing, Volatility, and Welfare
The argument relies on a well known framework, based on Lewis (2000) and
Obstfeld (1994). As they do, we abstract from non tradability and non separa-
bility in utility, and from the possible impact of uncertainty on growth. These
simplifications enable us to compute the welfare gains for risk sharing among a
large set of 74 countries.4
Following Epstein and Zin (1989), utility at time t in country j is given by
U jt =
{(
Cjt
)1−θ
+ β
[
Et
(
U jt+1
)1−γ](1−θ)(1−γ)}1/(1−θ)
(1)
where Cjt is consumption at time t in country j. The process for endowment
income at time t in country j is
yjt = y
j
t−1 + µj −
1
2
σ2j + ε
j
t (2)
where yjt = lnY
j
t and ε
j
t ∼ N
(
0, σ2j
)
. 0 < β < 1 denotes the subjective
discount rate, γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and θ is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. µj denotes
the long run growth rate of output in country j, and σ2j its variance around
trend growth. Equation (2) assumes permanent shocks to income, which is
well known to magnify the welfare gains from diversification, for any pool size.
But the assumption does not affect how quickly welfare gains increase with the
number of countries sharing risk, the paper’s main question. The assumption
of permanent shocks is maintained for tractability.
As in Lewis (2000), the analysis focuses on the welfare gains afforded by inter-
national diversification. This assumes away alternative sources of consumption
smoothing, such as self insurance and saving. It is consistent with the purpose
of evaluating the potential from international risk sharing. Following Lewis
(2000) Cjt = Y
j
t under autarky, and time t welfare in country j is given by
U jt = C
j
t
(
1− βM1−θj
)−1/(1−θ)
(3)
where Mj = exp
(
µj −
1
2γσ
2
j
)
. If instead country j enters a risk sharing agree-
ment, it will have a claim on poolwide income, Y¯t, which we assume is distributed
log-normally, with mean µ¯ and volatility σ¯2: y¯t = y¯t−1 + µ¯−
1
2 σ¯
2 + ε¯t.
5 In the
pool, time t welfare in country j is therefore given by
U¯ jt = C¯
j
t
(
1− βM¯1−θ
)−1/(1−θ)
(4)
4With non-separabilities, the literature usually considers two countries only, see Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) or Coeurdacier (2009). Lewis and Liu (2014) consider up to eight countries,
but have to deal with issues of existence and uniqueness.
5Lewis (2000) shows the sum of log-linear processes can be approximated by a log-linear
process.
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where M¯ = exp
(
µ¯− 12γσ¯
2
)
, and C¯jt is consumption in country j at time t if
the country is part of the risk sharing pool.
How much of a claim does country j have on poolwide output? The only asset
available in country j is the security that pays Y jt , whose price is denoted by p
j
t .
Entering the pool means acquiring the security that pays poolwide output Y¯t,
whose price is denoted by p¯t. Therefore, as in Lewis (2000) country j’s claim
on poolwide output at time t > 0 is given by
C¯jt =
pjt
p¯t
Y¯t (5)
We now introduce the possibility that a cost has to be paid by any country j
willing to participate in the risk sharing agreement. The cost τj is paid once
and for all, at the time the agreement is contracted: it could for instance be
paid outside of the pool, to a supra-national agency, whose remit is to monitor
the agreement is subsequently honored, or to help provide relevant information
about the pool’s members.6 If the risk sharing agreement is contracted at time
0, this implies
C¯j0 =
pj0 − τj
p¯0
Y¯0 (6)
The cost τj affects only the level of initial consumption in country j, at the
time the pool is contracted: In particular, it does not affect the subsequent
growth rates of consumption for all countries in the pool. They are all equal
to the growth in Y¯t.
7 Therefore the introduction of the cost τj does not alter
the dynamic properties of the equilibrium established in Lewis (2000), which we
now discuss.
Once it is in the pool, consumption in country j obeys the following Euler
equation for all t > 0:
1 = βφEt

R¯φ−1t+1 Rjt+1
(
C¯jt+1
C¯jt
)
−θφ

 (7)
with φ = γ−1θ−1 , R¯t+1 =
Y¯t+1+p¯t+1
p¯t
, and Rjt+1 =
Y jt+1+p
j
t+1
pjt+1
. Analogously, poolwide
consumption is governed by the following Euler equation for all t > 0:
1 = βφEt

R¯φt+1
(
C¯jt+1
C¯jt
)
−θφ

 (8)
6See for instance Brennan and Cao (1997), or Kang and Stulz (1997).
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Equations (5), (7) and (8) constitute a system of differential equations in the
asset prices p¯t+1 and p
j
t+1. Since in the pool consumption grows at the constant
rate µ¯, Lewis (2000) shows that prices are given by
pjt = Y
j
t
βM¯−θHj
1− βM¯−θHj
(9)
p¯t = Y¯t
βM¯1−θ
1− βM¯1−θ
(10)
where Hj = exp
[
µj +
1
2γσ¯
2 − γcov
(
εjt , ε¯t
)]
.
We now introduce a measure of poolwide welfare gains, W , associated with
the formation of a pool of J countries at time zero. Equations (3) and (4) imply
that by definition
W =
∑J
j=1 U¯
j
0∑J
j=1 U
j
0
− 1
Since in autarky Cj0 = Y
j
0 , combining equations (3), (4) and (6) gives
W ≡W ∗ − T
where W ∗ is the percentage welfare gain associated with the same pool of size
J in the absence of any cost τj , and T =
Y¯0
p¯0
(1−βM¯1−θ)
−1/(1−θ)
∑J
j=1 Y
j
0 (1−βM
1−θ
j )
−1/(1−θ)
∑J
j=1 τj . For
sufficiently large costs T , the welfare gains W can be negative, so that a pool of
the corresponding size J is actually not optimal. We conjecture this possibility
underlies the absence of international risk sharing pools in the data.
With asset prices defined in equations (9) and (10), it is possible to compute
a value forW ∗ that only depends on the parameters of the model. In particular,
we have
W ∗ =
(1−βM¯1−θ)
−θ/(1−θ)
M¯
∑J
j=1 Y
j
0
Hj
1−βM¯−θHj∑J
j=1 Y
j
0
(
1− βM1−θj
)−1/(1−θ) − 1
The paper’s key contribution is to compute W ∗ letting J vary for all possible
subsets of countries in our sample. Our paper uses J = 74, a sample that
includes both developed and developing countries. To our knowledge, this is a
novel result. All that is needed for this purpose are calibrated values of β, γ
and θ, and estimates of Mj , Hj , Y
j
0 and M¯ for all countries j in any considered
pool of size J .
Importantly, the paper measures W ∗, the potential percentage welfare gains
associated with a given pool. There is no need to calibrate a value for τj , or
for T . The costs’ existence explains why full worldwide risk sharing may not
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be optimal, and thus justifies considering risk sharing over subsets of countries
only. For legibility, the paper also presents the welfare gains W ∗ as a share of
first best, worldwide gains.
In principle, overall potential gains W ∗ could be positive while some indi-
vidual countries could have negative potential gains from entering the pool. In
practice however, this does not seem to be a concern, as we show empirically in
Section 3.4.
How could risk sharing arrangements be limited to subsets of countries?
First, selective capital controls vis-a`-vis nonmembers could ensure that only the
residents of countries in the pool have access to GDP indexed securities. Alter-
natively, GDP swaps could be introduced along the lines proposed by Merton
(1990, 2002), either as a network of bilateral swaps, or as swaps intermediated
by a central entity for the pool. Each period, each country uses swap contracts
to pay the others the net difference between its current output and its share
in poolwide output. Participation in the network of swaps defines the pool
membership.
2.2 Implementation
This paper computes potential welfare gains W ∗ for subsets of countries of any
size J . For each size J , we seek to report the grouping of specific countries
that maximizes poolwide welfare (or, alternatively, that minimizes poolwide
volatility).
Proceeding incrementally, we use three approaches to computing diversifica-
tion gains. First, we focus on volatility reduction. We report the standard de-
viation of the growth rate for individual country consumption, σ2j in the model,
and compare it with the variance of the growth rate in poolwide GDP, σ¯2 in the
model. We use consumption in autarky and output in the pool because autarky
consumption reflects other insurance schemes that already exist in each coun-
try. This simple approach conveys most of the key economic intuition: σ¯2 falls
quickly as J increases. Second, we compute W ∗ as implied by these volatility
reductions, imposing at first that growth rates remain unchanged, i.e. µj = µ¯,
at a level that is calibrated. This follows exactly from Obstfeld (1994). As
was the case there, welfare is a monotonic transformation of volatility. Third
and finally, the assumption that growth rates are the same for all countries is
relaxed, and we use historical data to estimate µj and µ¯ in any pool of size J .
Searching for pools of countries of any size, that yield minimal variance (or
maximal welfare) is not straightforward, in light of the vast number of possible
combinations of countries. We consider the N = 74 countries in our sample
individually, then all of their possible combinations 2 countries at a time (of
which there are CN2 ), then 3 at a time (given by C
N
3 ), and so on, where C
N
J =
7
N !
J!(N−J)!) . The total number of partitions is
∑N
J=1 C
N
J = 2
N − 1. It quickly
reaches astronomical levels as N rises.
We implement a computational algorithm whose details are provided in a
Technical Appendix available upon request. We are able to keep track of all
possible combinations for any pool size J , for a sample containing up to 31
countries, i.e. 2.1× 109 combinations. This algorithm can handle, for example,
the universe of 26 emerging market countries—about 6.7 × 107 combinations.
But when the universe consists of all 74 countries, the same algorithm only
allows us to analyze all combinations of pools of size J = 7 or less (C747 =
1.8×109). Since CNJ = C
N
N−J , we can also draw the inventory of all combinations
of J = 67 or more.
Outside of these pool sizes, we need to resort to an approximation algorithm.
When N = 74 for instance, the total number of groups to consider increases
to 274 = 1.9 × 1022, too large for existing computing power. For each group,
one needs to sum GDP for all countries in the pool, to compute an aggregate
growth rate, the corresponding standard deviation, and covariances. Even if
each operation took a nanosecond to complete, running an exhaustive search
over all possible pools amongst 74 countries would take hundreds of centuries.
For sample sizes where exhaustive inventories are out of reach, we implement
recursive searches. We first run exhaustive searches up to the maximum pool
size where it is feasible. This includes all pools of maximum size J = 1, ..., 7
(or J = 67, ..., 74) drawn from the universe of 74 countries. For each J , we
order pools by decreasing volatility (or increasing welfare). Then, for each J ,
we save the best pool, but also the following S pools that include each country
in the sample. In other words, when drawing the inventories of groups of size
J , we collect the one group with lowest volatility, but also the next S groups
that contain country 1, the next S groups that contain country 2, and so on.
We therefore collect S ×N additional pools for each J . We choose S = 1, 351,
so that 1, 351× 74 ≃ 100, 000. We call these “seed” pools. We can collect seed
pools no matter the value of J . But for J ≤ 7 (or J ≥ 67) we know the universe
of all pools.
Then, for each pool size J , we isolate all groups that include the members
of the optimal pool of size J − 1, plus one of the N −J +1 remaining countries.
Among these, we find the best pool of size J , as well as the best new S × N
seed pools of size J . The procedure is iterated. There is a recursive aspect to
the approach, but at each stage we consider the best S pools for each of the N
countries: This gives plenty of opportunities for countries that are in the best
pool of size J − 1 to drop out at the next increment.
We have verified the reliability of this approximation in three different ways.
First, we ran exhaustive searches for all possible combinations for J = 1, ..., 7
and J = 67, ..., 74. We compared the groupings implied by these exhaustive
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inventories to the results of our approximation. They were always identical.
Second, we have experimented with different values for S, as low as 2, and have
found systematically the same results as with S = 1, 351. Third, for each pool
size J , we have compared the results implied by the approximation to large
numbers of alternative pools, composed of countries drawn randomly. We have
not found a single instance in which a pool drawn randomly was preferable to
those identified as the best through the approximation procedure.8
3 Data and Results
This section begins with a description of the data sources. We then build in-
tuition through a simple, single country example, and generalize it to the main
results. We describe a “global envelope” of the groupings that achieve maximal
risk-sharing gains for all sizes J . We first focus on volatility reduction holding
growth constant, then infer welfare gains holding growth constant, and finally
allow for growth rates to differ.
3.1 Data
Data on yearly real GDP and consumption are drawn from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. They are evaluated in purchasing power par-
ity (PPP) U.S dollars, for the period 1974–2004.9 The sample consists of 25
advanced, 26 emerging market, and 23 developing economies with complete cov-
erage and data of reasonable quality. The full country list is provided in the
Appendix. Advanced economies are defined following the International Mone-
tary Fund’s World Economic Outlook. The remaining economies are considered
emerging if they are included in either the stock-market-based International Fi-
nancial Corporation’s Major Index (2005), or JPMorgan’s EMBI Global Index
(2005), which includes countries that issue bonds on international markets. The
rest are classified as developing.
8Combinatorial problems similar to those we are tackling are the object of a large literature
in computer sciences. It revolves around the so-called “Traveling Salesman” problem, for
which well-established approximated solution methods exist. To our knowledge however none
can be applied to our baseline setup. For instance, Han, Ye and Zhang (2002) propose an
approximation algorithm that can be applied to minimize the variance of a sum. But we
minimize the variance of a weighted sum, where the weights themselves depend on the group’s
membership. Imbs and Mauro (2007) use the Han, Ye and Zhang (2002) algorithm to identify
risk diversification benefits for a given absolute size of the risk-sharing contract (for example,
a US$1 contract). That exercise involves an unweighted average of GDP growth rates. Those
conclusions are virtually identical to what we get here with recursive searches.
9Previous studies (for example, Backus and Smith, 1993; and Ravn, 2001) have estab-
lished that real exchange rate fluctuations worsen the case for international risk sharing. In-
deed, GDP data at market exchange rates would imply far higher volatility—harder to hedge
through international risk sharing. Using PPP-adjusted data amounts to assuming that all
countries value the same consumption bundle in utility
9
We use these data to compute autarkic growth and volatility in consumption,
and poolwide growth and volatility in GDP. The approach makes use of the
variance-covariance matrix in GDP growth to infer expected gains arising from
international risk sharing. A key assumption is that this matrix is relatively
stable over time, which seems to be the case in the data. For instance, Doyle
and Faust (2005) show that there is no evidence of significant changes in the
correlation of output growth rates or other macroeconomic aggregates, despite
claims that rising integration among the G-7 economies has increased cycles
synchronization. And a large empirical literature has documented the cross-
sectional properties of international business cycles, which appear to have highly
persistent determinants, such as trade linkages or patterns of production (see
Frankel and Rose, 1998 or Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005).10
3.2 A Simple Example
To develop intuition, we first report the results corresponding to the pools that
minimize risk from the standpoint of an individual country, Chile. For each
pool size J , Figure 1 plots the standard deviation of the growth rate of poolwide
GDP for the group of countries containing Chile chosen to minimize poolwide
volatility. This is not a welfare measure, which explains its non-monotonicity
with respect to J . The envelopes are displayed for various sample restrictions.
There are four cases: pools drawn from the whole sample of 73 countries; pools
with other emerging markets; with other emerging markets in Latin America;
or with advanced economies. To give a sense of the importance of choosing well
one’s risk-sharing partners, a fifth line also plots the maximum value of σ¯ for
all pools containing Chile, and for all J .
Several results deserve mention. First, the lowest possible standard deviation
for poolwide GDP growth in a group that includes Chile is 0.61%, far below
4.41% for Chile itself. The minimum obtains for a group of 20 countries. Second,
a small number of carefully chosen partners is sufficient to yield the bulk of
available diversification benefits. With just one well-chosen partner (France),
poolwide standard deviation falls to 1.26%. For the best pool of seven members,
the standard deviation of GDP growth reaches 0.72%, barely above the absolute
minimum. Not surprisingly, this obtains for a motley set of economies: Austria,
Cameroon, Chile, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Sweden, and Syria.
As will become apparent, the finding that most diversification gains are
attained in relatively small pools holds in general. In the United States for
instance, despite the large size of the U.S. economy, pooling with another five
or six well-chosen economies implies a near halving of US volatility. This result
10Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2001) show that financial integration has an effect
on the sector specialization of production, and therefore on the international correlation of
business cycles. This paper abstracts from such possibility, taking as given the variance-
covariance matrix of international GDP growth rates.
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is reminiscent of the well-known finding in finance that a small set of stocks is
sufficient to provide most of the diversification opportunities available from a
market portfolio (Solnik, 1974). Marginal diversification gains quickly become
small, and even negative for J > 30. Beyond a certain pool size, hedging
opportunities are exhausted, and the pool starts including countries with high
volatilities, and positive covariances. A contrario, the (upper) envelope that
traces the worst possible pools of each size highlights the importance of choosing
one’s partners carefully. For small J , a poorly chosen pool can deliver higher
volatility than in autarky.
Various types of (economically relevant) constraints reduce maximum diver-
sification benefits. For example, Figure 1 reports the extent to which potential
gains decline when the universe of countries is constrained. The lowest attain-
able standard deviation is 0.61% for unconstrained pooling in Chile, but 0.87%
when Chile must pool with advanced countries only, 1.07% within the universe
of emerging markets, and 1.91% when pooling within Latin America. Risk-
sharing agreements that restrict the heterogeneity of the pool membership have
substantial consequences on the potential diversification gains.
3.3 The Global Envelope
We now generalize the approach. Pools with minimum volatility are not con-
strained anymore to include any given country. Figure 2 reports the envelope
of minimal output volatility for all pool sizes J using the recursive approach de-
scribed in section 2.2. The Figure reports minimal poolwide volatilities across
four different samples: pools of up to 74 countries, which traces a “global enve-
lope”, and pools within developing, emerging or advanced economies. Across all
four samples, the bulk of possible diversification gains is attained with relatively
small pools. The global envelope implies the lowest possible poolwide volatility
is 0.50%, and it is obtained in a pool of 17 countries. But volatility is already
as low as 0.62% for J = 7 along the global envelope. Thus, diversification gains
continue to be achieved within groups consisting of a small number of countries
in this general setup.11
The list of countries involved in minimum-volatility pools confirms that het-
erogeneity is key. Interestingly, the list overlaps with that obtained for Chile,
which suggests that the sample of countries providing the best hedging prop-
erties within a universe of 74 economies is relatively small and robust. The
variance-covariance matrix of GDP growth rates contains a few countries with
systematically negative off-diagonal elements, i.e. desirable hedging properties.
11The value reported for J = 1 corresponds to the standard deviation of the individual
GDP growth rate for the least volatile country during the sample period, namely France.
Diversification gains for specific countries cannot be easily read off the figure, because the
identities of countries involved in pools of different sizes change.
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Figure 2 also reports minimum volatilities for three sub-samples: advanced,
emerging, and developing countries. Diversification gains remain substantial
within each sub-sample, but in all cases the minimum levels of poolwide volatil-
ity are substantially higher than in the unconstrained sample. Advanced economies
achieve smaller gains, consistent with their lower volatility and internationally
correlated business cycles. All four envelopes display the same non-monotonicity
as in Figure 1, with high marginal diversification gains for J < 10. They turn
negative for J > 15, when countries with poor hedging properties start being
included.
Figures 1 and 2 help quantify the diversification gains that could accrue to
the representative consumer living in a pool of a given size. It captures the
decrease in output volatility as pool size increases. This is an input in the
welfare gains from pooling risk, which we next evaluate.
3.4 Welfare Gains
This sub-section turns to computing welfare W ∗. This requires calibrating the
preference parameters β, γ and θ, and estimating Mj , Hj , Y
j
0 and M¯ for all
countries j in any considered pool of size J . The subjective discount rate β is
set at 0.95, θ = 2 and γ = 5. These are later subjected to robustness checks. For
each country and each pool, Mj is computed using consumption data, but M¯ ,
Hj , and Y
j
0 are computed using GDP: In autarky, consumption data are used
because they reflect existing sources of insurance, for instance inter-temporal.
But in the pool, it is GDP data that must be used, because they reflect the
potential for risk sharing of a given pool of size J .
Growth rates are still constrained to be equal across countries, µj = µ¯ = 3%.
With this constraint, U jt and U¯
j
t are never close to zero, and welfare is well
behaved: This will no longer be the case any longer when growth rates are
allowed to vary by country. This happens because, as in Lewis (2000), utility
may become unbounder under certain parametrizations. Such issues are absent
from our sample of 74 countries when GDP growth rates are constant, but do
appear in Section 3.5, where historical growth rates are used to calibrate µj .
Figure 3 reports the highest value ofW ∗ for every pool size J . In the Figure,
W ∗ is expressed in percentage of the first best welfare gains obtained with full
risk sharing worldwide. The results are reported once again for four different
samples. Welfare gains increase monotonically with J , as they should, with a
maximum for J = N . Just as for volatility, the marginal increases in W ∗ are
largest for J < 10. Marginal gains begin to peter out as soon as J > 7 or 8. This
holds true for the whole sample, but also across the four sub-groups of countries
considered, among advanced, emerging, or developing countries. Interestingly,
the gains are largest for emerging markets, and smallest for developing countries.
This reflects the relative heterogeneity in business cycles in the former group.
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Table 1 reports summary statistics for the key variables serving as inputs to
the welfare computations. The Table reports the extrema, mean and median
values for σj , µj , cov
(
εjt , ε¯t
)
, and pjt / p¯t, for the universe of countries in our
dataset, J = 74. The volatility in GDP growth ranges from 0.01% to 4.32%, with
median 0.20 and mean 0.38. The distribution of country volatilities is slightly
skewed, with a few countries displaying exceptionally volatile business cycles.
These are the countries for which risk insurance is particularly desirable. GDP
growth is distributed symmetrically, ranging from 1.18 to 8.35%, with mean and
median values close to each other, around 3.5%. The distribution of the covari-
ances between idiosyncratic and poolwide growth rates is heavily skewed, with
minimum −0.026 and maximum 0.048. There are very few countries with neg-
ative covariances, i.e., very few countries that represent especially good hedges
worldwide. Finally, the relative prices pjt / p¯t are heavily skewed, with a median
percentage share of 3.22, but a mean equal to 1.34%. This reflects that most
countries have very small claims to the worldwide mutual fund, while very few
have large claim, up to 26.15% for J = 74. The distribution of welfare gains is
therefore highly unequal.
Table 2 explores the composition of W ∗ for various pools. To do so, a
measure of individual countries’ welfare gains upon entry in the pool, δj , is
introduced. δj satisfies:
U j0
[
Cj0 (1 + δj) , µj , σ
2
j
]
= U j0
[
C¯0, µ¯, σ¯
2
]
. (4)
Similar to Lewis (2000) and Obstfeld (1994), δj is the percent increase in con-
sumption that would make country j indifferent between autarky and full risk-
sharing in a pool. Table 2 calculates δj for all countries for four specific samples,
under the same parametrization as the one used to estimate W ∗.
Table 2 reports the minimum value of δj , its median, and the value of W
∗
for four specific pools. The first pool is formed by the entire 74-country sample:
there, δj equals 1.9% of permanent poolwide consumption on average (unre-
ported). But the distribution of δj across the membership is skewed, with a
minimum for the US at 0.50%, and a median for Hong Kong at 6.21%. The wel-
fare consequences of pools are heterogeneous across their membership, reflecting
the very heterogeneity of the constituent countries.
Individual country’s welfare gains decrease with per capita income, because
they increase with autarkic output volatility. Among advanced economies, me-
dian δj equals 0.89%, whereas it is 4.97% in emerging markets and 7.17% in
developing countries. The distribution of δj is also less dispersed in homoge-
neous pools: for advanced countries, its minimum value is 0.40%, and its me-
dian 0.89%. Contrast this with the dispersion of δj among developing countries,
with a minimum of 1.00%, and a median of 7.17%. The heterogeneity in out-
put volatility is much more pronounced there. In all cases, the welfare gains
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are positive for all countries, since the minimum gains reported in Table 2 are
strictly positive.
How important is carefully chosen diversification in reaping the benefits de-
scribed in Figure 3? How do the optimal pools described in the Figure differ
from alternative groupings of countries, drawn randomly? In Figure 4 we report
the welfare gains implied by pools drawn at random. We consider random draws
of 10, 000 pools for each value of J . The Figure reports the maximum value of
W ∗, normalized by the first best welfare gains, as implied by the 10, 000 draws,
along with its 99th and 95th percentiles. For ease of comparability, it also re-
produces the recursive maximum reported in Figure 3. The random maximum
displays a trend increase in J , with some convexity. As J increases, the gains
fluctuate quite considerably around the trend, reflecting the importance of a
few countries in delivering the smooth welfare gains from Figure 3. But the
99th and 95th percentiles lose any similitude with the recursive measure: they
are almost linear in J , and miss most of the convexity apparent from previous
Figures. In other words, while high values of W ∗ can be reached for low values
of J , this only happens in extremely rare groupings of countries. Diversification
gains do not accrue quickly between countries selected at random.
The welfare gains from risk insurance obviously depend on the calibration of
preferences, and more specifically on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Figures 3 and 4 correspond to specific values of the rate of time preference
β = 0.95, the coefficient of risk aversion γ = 5, and θ = 2, which corresponds to
a relatively low elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5. Unsurprisingly,
the welfare gains of international risk sharing depend on all parameter values:
they increase in risk aversion, fall in the intertemporal elasticity, and fall in the
rate of time preference. But varying these parameters has symmetric effects
on the first best, worldwide welfare gains, and on the poolwide welfare gains.
Since our measures of W ∗ are always normalized, the proportional increases we
document in Figures 3 and 4 are in fact invariant to alternative calibrations of
these three important parameters.12
3.5 Pooling Growth Rates
The previous section computes W ∗ holding growth rates constant. In principle,
countries with relatively high expected growth rates should be able to obtain
a higher share of poolwide consumption, with higher values for pj0. In practice
however, the challenges involved in predicting growth rates make it difficult
to incorporate differences in expected growth into risk-sharing contracts. For
instance, country rankings with respect to growth rates change dramatically
from one decade to the next, as shown by Easterly and others (1993). To
estimate expected economic growth, this section simply considers the average
12These results are available upon request.
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of historical growth rates over the entire period under consideration. We also
assume that individual countries’ growth rates are unaffected by risk sharing.
We estimate µj as the 1975-2004 average of GDP growth in country j, and µ¯
as the 1975-2004 average of poolwide GDP growth, for any pool of size J . A
possible concern might be that lower volatility in a pool may create lower mean
growth. But this seems unlikely in light of the evidence that lower-volatility
countries tend to have relatively high mean growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
So our estimates of W ∗ on the basis of historical growth rates represent if
anything a lower bound.
Figure 5 reproduces Figure 3, using historical values for µj and µ¯. It confirms
the broad pattern of our results: Most marginal gains in W ∗ accrue for J < 10.
More than 80% of maximum W ∗ are reached in pools of 10 countries or fewer.
In all samples the shape of the envelopes remains the same.
An issue with using historical growth rates is the possibility of zero utility
in the definition of U jt . We ensure this does not happen by constraining βM
1−θ
j
away from 1. In particular, we drop combinations of parameters that result
in 0.98 < βM1−θj < 1.2. With these constraints, there are no instances of
unbounded utility, or of non-positive prices for any value of cov
(
εjt , ε¯t
)
.This
reduces the sample to a maximum of 59 countries, listed in the Appendix, where
3 advanced countries, 7 emerging markets, and 5 developing economies were
dropped. There is no reason to expect the dropped countries would be precisely
the ones that invalidate the convexity of the welfare function apparent in Figure
5.
It is not apparent from Figure 5, which is normalized, but when growth
rates are country-specific, the levels of W ∗ shift up for all J - and so do the
gains from worldwide risk sharing. Such a systematic rise is reminiscent of
Obstfeld (1994), who argued international financial integration gives access to
high returns, which can have large welfare consequences. In unreported work, we
obtained poolwide weighted averages of µj , computed for all J . We compared
them with µ¯, once again computed for all pools. We found little difference
amongst developing countries, some improvement for advanced economies, and
largest increases for emerging markets. Historical growth rates are such that it
is among emerging markets that growth increases would be most pronounced
for countries participating in a pool. As a result, the increase in W ∗ is largest
in this sample.
4 Pooling Risk Within Sub-Samples
The previous section establishes substantial welfare gains are accessible to small
pools of countries. Yet risk sharing agreements, or GDP contingent securities,
are rarely observed. The reasons for this are not clear (see Borensztein and
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Mauro, 2004, for a review). Some authors have suggested that this absence may
be due, for example, to difficulties in acquiring information about other countries
or in enforcing international contracts, perhaps because of weak institutions.
Such difficulties are summarized by T in Section 2.1; it stands to reason that
the costs implied by such issues should depend on the size and the composition
of a pool of risk-sharing countries.
To further explore these issues, we create samples determined by institutional
quality or regional proximity, which is often synonymous with strong trade
linkages. Goods trade creates incentives to honor international commitments
towards trade partners - often a neighbor in a given region. We compute W ∗
for pools of countries that are constrained to belong to the same category, e.g.
with high institutional quality.
Then existing regional agreements are considered. These include free-trade
agreements, such as the European Union, the ASEAN or Mercosur. We also
include pools that were built to provide some degree of cross-country insurance
(but clearly fall short of complete risk sharing). We consider the Chiang-Mai
Initiative and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). We illustrate the
reduction in consumption volatility that would occur under complete sharing
of GDP risk in the various samples considered. Potential welfare gains W ∗ are
computed in each case, then compared with the type of welfare gains that could
be attained in a pool of identical size, but whose membership would be entirely
unconstrained.
4.1 Institutional Quality
We explore the effects of restricting the sample on the basis of default his-
tory and scores on the measures of institutional quality that capture contract
enforcement. Two definitions are considered. The first, labeled “excellent en-
forceability” includes all countries that were in the top half of the distribution
of the institutional quality index compiled by Kaufmann et al (2005), and that
never experienced severe international repayment difficulties between 1970 and
2004. The second, “above-average institutional quality” is based on the institu-
tional quality index only. In addition to advanced countries, the former sample
includes four emerging markets and developing countries, whereas the latter
includes eight emerging markets and three developing countries.
For each sub-sample, Table 3 reports the median value of aurtakic consump-
tion volatility σj across the countries j in the sample. Column (2) reports the
minimum variance σ¯ that can be obtained in a pool formed by countries in the
indicated sample, for any pool size. Column (3) reports the median δj for each
indicated sample, and column (4) reports the corresponding value for W ∗. The
latter two measures are computed assuming µj = µ¯ = 3%.
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Column (1) confirms output volatility is higher in countries with poor institu-
tions. It is 5.24% with low enforceability vs. 2.25% with excellent enforceability,
and 5.45% with institutional quality below average vs. 3.04% if it is above aver-
age. Column (2) suggests the diversification gains from volatility reduction are
larger in groups with poor institutions: a decrease of around 4 percentage points
for such groups, as against 1.5 percent for pools with good institutions. This
translates in drastically larger welfare gains for countries with poor institutions
in column (3). The last column in Table 3 reports estimates of W ∗. Countries
with institutions that ensure excellent contract enforceability can only achieve
32% of first-best worldwide risk-sharing gains. But the complementary set of
countries, below excellent enforceability, can achieve more than 60% of first-best
welfare gains.
The lower panel of Table 3 reports the same statistics, for pools selected
on the basis of their regional proximity. We consider three economic zones:
the European Union, Asian emerging countries, and Latin American emerging
economies. Geographical constraints turn out to be very important for advanced
European countries. With a median volatility σj of 1.91%, individual country’s
welfare gains δj are well below 1%. As a result, these pools can hope to achieve at
best 10.15% of first-best welfare gains. The result presumably reflects high cycle
synchronization between rich economies in general, with little diversification to
be gained.
The same is not true of emerging markets, with median volatilities σj of
3.93% in Asia and 5.14% in Latin America. Column (2) illustrates that pooled
volatility σ¯ can be reduced to just below 2%. For both groups, individual coun-
try’s median welfare gains are between 3% and 5% of permanent consumption,
and W ∗doubles to around 20% of first-best welfare. In other words, pooling
risk among homogeneous European countries carries little gain. Potential gains
are substantially larger in (relatively heterogeneous) emerging Asia or emerg-
ing Latin America. But either still fall considerably short of what is possible
within emerging markets as a whole, or within countries with poor institutions
in general.
4.2 Existing Groupings
Finally, we consider the potential welfare gains that would arise if complete
risk-sharing were achieved within groups of countries that already exist for
other purposes. We include free-trade agreements, whose participants have
long-established cooperation, as well as arrangements that involve an element of
macroeconomic risk-sharing, such as the Chiang-Mai Initiative and the FLAR.
At present, none of these groups explicitly seek to share GDP risk. But we
consider them interesting, because their previous history of cooperation and
trade and financial relations would presumably make it easier for these groups
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to attain the information and mutual trust that would be required to move to
complete risk sharing.13
Table 4 reports the results for several such agreements. Row (1) reports
the median value of country-level autarkic volatility σj for each group. Row
(2) is the value of each pool’s diversified volatility, σ¯Pool, which is then com-
pared with row (3), the minimum value of σ¯, σ¯Min, that can be achieved
in any, unconstrained pool of similar size J . Row (4) reports the value of
W ∗corresponding to the volatility reduction implied by the existing pool, σ¯Pool,
assuming µj = µ¯ = 3%.
Median volatility is highest in groupings that involve emerging markets, in
Asia (APEC, ASEAN, Chiang Mai), or in Latin America (FLAR), at around
4.5%. It is much smaller in Europe, at 1.19% in the EMU, or 1.91% in the
EU. Poolwide volatilities decrease substantially for the APEC, Chiang Mai,
and the FLAR, with values between 1.29 and 2.50%. In contrast, volatility
reduction is minimal in Europe. For instance, in the EMU poolwide volatility
is equal to its median value across the Union, so that risk sharing would lower
consumption volatility for half the membership only. This happens because
of the homogeneity in these countries business cycles, and their relatively low
volatility.
The values of W ∗ mirror these volatility reductions, along with the relative
sizes of each agreement. ASEAN and FLAR only involve five and seven coun-
tries, respectively. With relatively small reduction in volatility, the values ofW ∗
are around five percent of the potential first-best welfare gains. EMU, EU, and
APEC deliver much larger values of W ∗, around 30 percent of first-best gains.
This reflects large values of J , equal to 12, 18, and 16, respectively. These val-
ues are consistent with the convexity in Figure 3. The Chiang-Mai grouping is
interesting for a different reason: there are nine participating countries, but W ∗
is almost equal to 15 percent of first-best gains. This must be because of the
large volatility reduction afforded by this country grouping.
To isolate the relative importance of pool size vs. volatility reduction, the
third row in Table 4 reports the potential volatility reductions that would be
possible in carefully chosen pools of identical sizes, drawn from the full sample of
74 countries. Interestingly, these alternative groupings always deliver substan-
tially larger diversification gains in row (3) than in row (2), including for the
EMU. Of course, these pools are constituted of countries with much more het-
erogeneous business cycles than the groupings in the headings of Table 4. That
such small groups of countries can deliver large diversification gains, provided
the membership be chosen carefully, is the paper’s main point.
13For free-trade agreements, on the one hand, trade linkages imply a mutual interest in each
other’s economic performance and in honoring of international obligations; on the other hand,
trade partners are well known to have synchronized cycles, thus reducing risk-diversification
benefits (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1998.)
18
5 Conclusion
Despite a trend toward greater international financial integration, the full gains
from complete international risk sharing have hitherto remained elusive. In
this paper, we have shown that the bulk of these gains could effectively be
reaped in carefully chosen groupings of a small number of economies, often
less than ten. This makes it even harder to understand why risk sharing does
not arise endogenously. We conjecture it does not because of difficulties in
contracting risk sharing agreements between countries. Where such difficulties
are likely to be minimal, between countries with good quality institutions, or
established trade partners, we show that the potential welfare gains are minimal.
In contrast, those small pools that deliver large welfare gains are constituted
of economies that are often far away from each other, and include countries
with weak institutions or a history of default. Thus, a possible interpretation of
our empirical results is that complete risk sharing arrangements have remained
elusive because the potential welfare gains may be insufficient to offset obstacles
such as concerns about the difficulty of enforcing international contracts.
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 Appendix Table 1:  Country Samples
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Corporation’s Major Index (2005) or JPMorgan’s EMBI Global Index (2005), which includes countries that issue
bonds on international markets. The remaining countries are classified as developing. Above average institutional
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above average institutional quality and no defaults on international debt in 1970-2004 according to Detragiache
and Spilimbergo (2001) and Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). GDP data in current U.S. dollars are from the
IMF’s World Economic Outlook.) GDP data at PPP are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Stars denote countries that are excluded to preserve stationarity in Section 3.5.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for J=74
Minimum Mean Median Maximum
Volatility σj 0.016 0.381 0.202 4.326
Growth µj 1.179 3.552 3.349 8.355
Covariance cov(ǫj , ǫ¯) -0.0262 0.0030 0.0024 0.0479
Price pj/p¯ 0.0046 1.345 3.229 26.150
Notes: Summary statistics for the universe of 74 countries. cov(ǫj , ǫ¯) denotes the
covariance between individual countries and poolwide growth rates. The price
ratio pj/p¯ is defined in equations (9) and (10). All values are in percentages.
Real GDP and consumption data are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
Minimum δj Median δj W*                         
(Global risk-sharing  = 100)
Full Sample 0.55 4.10 100.00
United States Dominican Republic
Advanced Countries 0.40 0.89 28.33
United States Australia
Emerging Markets 1.67 4.97 57.51
Colombia Malaysia
Developing Countries 1.00 7.17 6.58
Bangladesh Madagascar
Table 2: Welfare Gains                                           
Notes: Minimum, median, and total welfare gains for sub-samples indicated,  assuming the same expected growth (3 percent) across 
countries.  The results assume θ=2, γ=5, and β=0.95.  Country lists are provided in the Appendix. GDP data are from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median σj 
individual     
country 
Minimum 
poolwide 
variance
Median δj W*( % worldwide 
risk-sharing) 
All countries (pooling with any country) 4.49 0.54 6.21 100.00
Costs of weak enforcement
Excellent enforceability countries (pooling only with excellent 
enforceability countries)
2.25 0.87 1.73 32.21
Below excellent enforceability countries (pooling only with below 
excellent enforceability countries) 
5.24 1.30 8.77 60.89
Above average inst. countries (pooling with only above average inst. 
countries)
3.04 0.82 2.65 44.67
Below average inst. countries (pooling with only below average inst. 
countries)
5.45 1.50 9.96 48.64
Costs of regional constraints
European Union (pooling only with EU) 1.91 1.05 0.68 10.15
Asian emerging (pooling only with Asian emerging) 3.93 1.84 2.98 18.18
Latin American emerging (pooling only with Latin American emerging) 5.14 1.90 4.96 21.56
Table 3: Gains from Risk Pooling Among Countries
Notes: Column (1) reports the median of σj (across countries in the indicated sub-sample).  Column (2) reports the median of the lowest possible standard deviation 
of poolwide growth (across countries in the indicated sub-sample).  Column (3) reports the median δj (across countries in the indicated sub-sample) assuming 
growth rates fixed at 3 percent per annum.  Column (4) reports W*, assuming growth fixed at three percent per annum. 
Table 4. Poolwide Volatility and Welfare for Selected Groups
APEC ASEAN CHIANG MAI EMU EU FLAR
Median σj 4.44 4.53 4.48 1.19 1.91 4.62
σ¯Pool 1.29 3.47 1.40 1.19 1.09 2.50
σ¯Min 0.68 0.86 0.79 0.66 0.65 0.71
W∗ 29.05 5.25 14.50 29.71 32.17 5.67
(worldwide = 100)
Notes: Median country volatility σj , poolwide volatility σ¯Pool , and minimum poolwide volatility
σ¯Min that can be achieved in any, unconstrained pool with the same number of countries J. The
welfare gains W∗ use σ¯Pool. Growth is set at 3 percent, θ = 2, γ = 5, and β = 0.95. The
list of countries in each sample is in the Appendix. GDP data are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
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Figure 1. Benefits of diversification under various restrictions:
The case of Chile
Notes: The figure reports the standard deviation of the growth rate of aggregate (poolwide) GDP for the pool (of each size)
that yields the lowest standard deviation (or the highest, in the case of the top line). Each group is constrained to contain
Chile. GDP data at purchasing power parity are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The pool
yielding the lowest (or highest) standard deviation is found by checking all possible combinations of countries for each J and
each sample, and using the approximation procedure described in the text.
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Figure 2: Lowest poolwide volatility envelopes for samples constrained 
by level of development
Notes: The figure reports the standard deviation of the growth rate of poolwide GDP for the pool (of each size) that yields
the lowest standard deviation for each sub-sample. The pool yielding the lowest standard deviation is found by checking all
possible combinations of countries and by running the approximation procedure described in the text. GDP data are from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Developing
Countries
EmergingMarkets
AdvancedCountries
FullSample
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
T
o
t
a
l
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
g
a
i
n
s
 
(
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
r
i
s
k
-
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
 
=
 
1
0
0
)
 
Pool Size J
Figure3:PoolingGains
Notes: For each pool size, the figure reports the highest possible value for W∗ using the procedure described in the text.
Welfare gains are computed assuming γ = 5, β = 0.95, θ = 2, and a constant growth rate of three percent for all countries and
pools. GDP data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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Figure4:RandomPoolsandActualGains
Notes: For each pool size, the figure reports the highest possible value for W∗ using the procedure described in the
text. In addition, the figure reports the maximum, 99th percentile, and 95th percentile obtained from 10,000 random
pool draws. Welfare gains are computed using the W∗ formula given in the text assuming γ = 5, β = 0.95, θ = 2
and a constant growth rate of three percent for all countries and pools. GDP data are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
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Figure5:PoolingGains
(CountryͲSpecificGrowthRates)
Notes:
The figure reports the highest possible values for W∗ using the search procedure and the formula described in the text. The
results assume γ = 5, β = 0.95, θ = 2, and country-specific growth rates, given by their historical means. GDP data are from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
